Introduction
Within medical regulation literature internationally, there is now wide recognition that efforts to improve patient safety are partly contingent on the establishment of effective and appropriate mechanisms for responding to complaints from members of the public about the doctors who treat them (Beaupert et al 2014) .
Equally, however, it is acknowledged that public understanding and awareness of the processes in place to protect them from unsafe or poorly-performing doctors is all too often highly limited, and for those unfortunate enough to require recourse to them, fraught with uncertainty and the potential for emotional trauma (Reader et al 2014) . The United Kingdom (UK) is no different in this regard (Ehrich 2006) .
In 2013 the UK government published the report of the Francis inquiry into serious failings in care at Mid-Staffordshire National Health Service (NHS) Foundation Trust. The Francis inquiry was concerned with 1,200 preventable deaths which occurred over a three year period at the Trust's hospital. In its findings, the report of the inquiry noted that although patient complaints had identified problems of neglect and poor care at the trust, deficiencies in complaint handling resulted in critical warning signs being missed (Francis 2013) . Furthermore, the report described a culture of fear, secrecy and defensiveness in which whistle-blowers were silenced and relatives ignored (Simpson and Morris 2014) .
The Francis report is the latest in a long-line of high profile medical scandals in the UK over the last two decades, which includes Bristol Royal Infirmary in 1997, Alder Hey Children's Hospital in 1999, and more lately, Morecombe Bay NHS Foundation Trust in 2015 (Dyer 2015) . All of which have highlighted concerns surrounding the ability and willingness of NHS systems and medical leaders, to identify and 4 satisfactorily deal with underperformance and medical mistakes. The proposed creation of a statutory duty of candour to ensure openness and transparency amongst NHS staff through establishing a legal obligation to report treatment or care they believe has caused death or serious injury, is the latest governmental attempt to address this issue (GMC 2015a) .
In this article I examine recent reforms to the General Medical Council (GMC) which have been implemented to improve how it responds to complaints and instigates disciplinary proceedings against doctors via a fitness to practise panel (GMC 2013a) . These changes are designed to address the criticism that rather than pursing its statutory duty to secure the public interest, its processes have first and foremost acted to protect doctors (Brazier and Ost 2013) . In addition to NHS complaint procedures operating at a local level in hospitals and general practice surgeries, a number of national-level bodies respond to complaints against medical practitioners (Clwyd and Hart 2013) . The National Clinical Assessment Service, the Care Quality Commission, as well as the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, are all important points of contact for responding to patient complaints (Chamberlain 2015) . However, the General Medical Council, that operates using powers provided legislation (the Medical Act 1983) , is the only body with the authority to remove a doctor from the medical register of approved practitioners and as a result, prevent them from practising medicine in the UK.
The General Medical Council remains the principal formal legal mechanism for medical regulation and responding to complaints about the fitness to practise of doctors (Williams et al 2014) . As a consequence, any changes made to the General Medical Council, possess the potential to promote far reaching change in the patient experience of complaining about a doctor (Gallagher and Mazor 2015) . But 5 before exploring this further, it is necessary to first situate my analysis of the current system within current academic debate surrounding the emergence of riskbased regulation within the medical and healthcare sphere, in order to highlight its contribution to this literature.
Risk-based medical regulation
The regulation of medical work in the UK has undergone a period of far reaching reform over the last decade as a result of external pressures broadly similar to those noted internationally in the US, European, Chinese, Indian and Australasian contexts (Bismark et al 2015 , Pan et al 2015 , Saks 2015 , Toth 2015 and WaltonRoberts 2015 . Against the background of the fluxing conditions of the postrecession global political-economy, a growing tension between rising running costs and the advocacy of greater patient choice and rights of access, has led to state intervention to promote non-medical involvement in the delivery of health care services and their quality assurance (Giarelli, et al 2014 Brown et al 2015 .
Although significant national variation exists in how this state of affairs both presents itself and plays out, the key result, particularly in the US and Europe, has been an intensification and expansion of managerial discourses and practices shaping the activity of the health care system and monitoring the performance of medical work (de Vries et al 2009 , Risso-Gill 2014 .
Healthcare managerialism utilises a mixture of 'hard' and 'soft' forms of administrative bureaucratic power which operate on institutional structures and human subjectivities via performance monitoring and appraisal mechanisms -such as standard and target setting, audit and appraisal -while simultaneous seeking to retain the appearance of devolved discretion and control over decision making 6 processes at a local level, primarily due to the highly specialised nature of professional forms of expertise (Courpasson 2000 , Sheaff et al 2003 , Checkland et al 2007 , Checkland and Harrison 2010 , Exworthy 2015 . In this article, I argue that such managerial discourses have proliferated throughout the health and social care sphere in the UK in the last two decades, and have become increasingly inculcated within professional regulatory systems, as the state has acted legislatively under a modernising agenda to minimise costs and risks by supporting greater managerial involvement in the governance of public services (Baldwin 2004 , Saks 2014 ). Hood and Millier (2010:1) argue that we live in 'the age of risk-based regulation'. This is marked by professional self-regulation -where elite groups within a profession possess control over the regulatory institutions that set and maintain training, practice and disciplinary standards -giving way to regulated selfregulation -where the state legislates to subject the activity of professional groups and their regulatory institutions to independent oversight (Chamberlain 2015) . For example, in the UK, the Medical Act 1858 established de facto medical control over the General Medical Council as its board members were primarily drawn from representatives of institutions controlled by doctors, medical schools and the royal colleges, supplemented by a small number of elected members drawn from the rank and file of the profession. Yet the Health and Social Care Act 2008 not only required equal non-medical lay involvement in the running of the General Medical Council, it also subjected it to independent scrutiny via the Professional Standards Authority. This body reports directly to parliament and is tasked with reviewing decisions made by UK regulators about practitioners' fitness to practise. Importantly, it possesses the power to appeal decisions to the High Court (Court of Session in Scotland) if it considers them to be insufficient for the 7 protection of the public This approach allows the state to subject the operation of the General Medical Council to risk-based managerial performance imperatives, such as institutional audit and target-driven outcome-based performance appraisal, while also allowing it to retain a necessary degree of discretion over professional decision-making in relation to the training and discipline of rank and file members.
A key outcome, therefore, of this shift toward regulated self-regulation for the UK medical profession has been that doctors and their professional institutions now possess a much more externally managed and risk-adverse form of professional autonomy than has historically been the case (Saks 2015) . Certainly, over the last three decades the day-to-day practices of doctors have become increasingly subject to surveillance and risk-management by NHS management, the General Medical Council and elite professional medical bodies, most notably the royal colleges. The introduction of medical revalidation by the Health and Social Care Act 2008 is the latest example of this trend (Dent et al 2016) . Revalidation requires the periodic (every five years) recertification of a doctor's fitness to practise, in order for them to remain on the medical register and practice medicine in the UK. The logistics involved in ensuring that all medical practitioners are revalidated has meant that its introduction nationally has taken several years and indeed, it was not fully rolled out until 2016.
The implementation of revalidation is indicative of a regulatory process undergoing a transformative period of reform from being a reactive, incident-led regime preoccupied with ensuring medical privilege, to a proactive risk-adverse overseer of professional standards designed to secure public safety Woods 2010). However, whatever the value of revalidation as a tool for supporting regulatory reform towards forms of regulated self-regulation which are focused on ensuring public safety through a risk-focused lens, there undoubtedly has been a perceptible increase within the medical profession of the view that the primary purpose of the new regulatory regime is to be more discipline-oriented and punitive (Brennan 2014). Researchers have found that not only do rank-and-file doctors tend to have a cynical attitude about the substantive capacity of revalidation to identify underperforming doctors, but also, for many its introduction symbolises a discernible orientation towards more publicly 'naming and shaming' individual doctors, even when doubt exits over the cause of a clinical error (Bridges et al 2014, Entwistle and Matthews 2015) . I will explore this issue in more detail in the next section when I discuss the impact of reforms to the complaint and medical tribunal process.
Lloyd-Bostock and Hutter (2008) suggest that risk-based regulation is an elusive and slippery term, which is perhaps best conceived 'as a cluster of tools and characteristics rather than a clearly defined and coherent method ' (2008:70) . Day et al (2016) echo these sentiments in their pilot study of the growing role of risk management tools in the domain of applied health research. Revalidation, with its focus on the anticipation and manageability of risk via periodic performance appraisal focused on individual competence, is one example of such a tool (Chamberlain 2015) . In this article I explore another risk-focused regulatory tool which has not been paid as much attention as revalidation: the patient complaint and tribunal process. There has been a tendency within the academic literature to focus conceptually and empirically on exploring the impact of regulatory reforms in medicine by examining the introduction of managerialist tools designed to 9 support risk-identification and analysis methods, such as medical audit or contractual annual appraisal, for example (see Dent et al 2016) . Yet the complaint and tribunal process must also be examined if we are to obtain as rounded a picture as possible of the impact of contemporary regulatory reforms on both the medical profession and the public experience of health care delivery (Chamberlain 2012) .
By focusing on the complaint and tribunal process, I aim to supplement and extend the existing academic corpus concerned with contemporary developments in the professions and shift towards risk-based regulation in the medical and healthcare spheres. In particular, I critically investigate an important feature of contemporary developments in the modernisation of medical regulation. Namely that, in pushing through regulatory reform, the UK state rhetorically advocates greater public involvement in healthcare governance and medical regulatory processes. But in reality, as Dent et al (2016) note, calls for greater non-medical involvement in healthcare and medical regulation, no matter how well intentioned, have all too often ended up as being a tokenistic smokescreen for greater administrative and managerial control, rather than being a progressive platform for promoting closer public/professional co-operation and collaborative partnership.
Hence, by focusing on the diversity of patient involvement within the complaint and tribunal process, I aim to place under the microscope a hitherto relatively under-examined problem space from which pertinent questions and new areas for investigation may emerge, which furthermore, serve to challenge the entrenched medical and managerial interests that surround the contemporary regulation of doctors (Short 2015) . For example, it may well be that only by promoting greater diversity in user participation in regulatory processes, with the goal of embedding within health care managerial and professional systems a working culture which prioritises the patient experience and need, rather than cost minimisation and mutual protectionism, that the possible negative excesses of risk-based regulatory approaches can be more fully accounted for and the public interest protected.
I have two main objectives in this article. Firstly, to contribute to current academic discourses surrounding the shift toward risk-based models of professional regulation in the United Kingdom (UK), and secondly, to do so by outlining reforms in the UK complaint and medical tribunal process. To achieve these objectives I bring together empirical data from a variety of already published official and academic sources concerning the patient and practitioner experience of the complaint and medical tribunal process. I supplement this with empirical data obtained from the General Medical Council, through a freedom of information request, regarding the make-up of the medical tribunal panel members in terms of their gender, age and race and ethnicity. This is an emerging area of research as it is only in the last decade that it has been possible for non-medical members to gain the necessary access to the previously closed-shop regulatory 'medical club' needed to develop a more conceptually finegrained critical analysis of this aspect of the practice of medicine in the UK (Chamberlain 2015) . Thus, in this article I use a mixture of sources to develop my analysis. However, I see this article as developing arguments and key points that will require further empirical validation, and furthermore, that this will only be achievable through sustained independent investigation of the operation of the medical tribunal process over time. Indeed, it may well be another decade (or more) before the impact of the emergence of risk-based approaches in the field of medical regulation is fully knowable, particularly given that medical revalidation was not fully implemented in the UK until 2016, and that reforms to the medical complaint and tribunal process are currently ongoing.
Nonetheless, I will show in this article that the existing data does indicate important limitations of the current governmental-driven regulatory reform focus on more effective cost and risk management within healthcare. In particular, that there has been a failure to broaden the diversity of public involvement in regulatory processes, and as such an element of cautionary doubt must remain over their ability to secure the public interest.
Complaints and medical tribunal reform: A more punishment-focused regime?
The salience of media driven narratives in contemporary society, which substantively shape and inform public opinion, as well as serve to further politicise health care reforming agendas, means that there is an ever present need for publicly accountable bodies, such as the General Medical Council, to demonstrate institutional effectiveness in the face of growing independent evaluation of their activities (Baldwin 2004). As a result, perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a growing perception within the medical profession that the General Medical Council has become far less tolerant of infractions (Bridges et al 2014) .
Therefore, it is interesting to consider whether the General Medical Council has, in reality, become a more punitive institution. It is certainly the case that legislative changes have been made to the case management and pre-tribunal process to allow the General Medical Council to be more proactive in managing caseloads via 12 interim order panels, which restrict a doctor's practice while allegations about their conduct are being resolved (MPTS 2015) . At the same time, there has been a move to separate the General Medical Council's investigatory and adjudicatory functions in order to secure greater institutional transparency and allay concerns that its complaint system is biased toward doctors. Finally, and related to this latter point, the level of proof required to secure a tribunal conviction has been reduced. Traditionally, the evidentiary burden to be met was that of the criminal standard of proof -beyond reasonable doubt -it is now the lower civil standard of proof-on the balance of probabilities (Quirk 2013). This reform was justified on the grounds that historically the General Medical Council had often been unable to remove a doctor from the medical register, even when doubt existed over their clinical performance, because the standard of proof required was unduly high, and this has impacted significantly upon the number of successful prosecutions (William et al 2015) .
There has been much criticism within the profession regarding the reduction in the standard of proof required to secure a fitness to practise conviction and strike a doctor off the medical register, with many viewing it as signifying that the General Medical Council is adopting a more punitive stance towards doctors when it receives complaints (Chamberlain 2015) . Evidence exists to suggest that the General Medical Council is more proactively seeking to restrict a doctor's practice, in addition to issuing more warnings and providing individual doctors (and their employers) with informal advice and guidance, with this trebling from little over 400 in 2010 to over 1,200 in 2015 (Gallagher and Foster 2015) . There is also a developing body of research to indicate that pre-hearing investigative measures are traumatising for doctors who suffer from health-related problems in particular, 13 and in some instances this is leading them to agree to high impact sanctions, namely suspension or erasure from the medical register, before they attend a tribunal hearing, with the hearing subsequently becoming a 'rubber stamp' exercise (Horsfall 2015) .
This in itself raises profound concerns over the procedural fairness of the changes made to the General Medical Council processes. Researchers reporting on the experiences of nearly 8,000 doctors found that those who had recently been the subject of a complaint were twice as likely as other doctors to report moderate or severe anxiety, and twice as likely to have thoughts of self-harm (see Bourne 2015) . Further evidence suggests that doctors referred to the General Medical
Council have especially high rates of psychological illness, with 26% reporting moderate to severe depression and 22% cent reporting moderate to severe anxiety (Moberly 2014) . Moreover, since 2004 96 doctors have died while facing a fitness to practise investigation, which suggests that there are legitimate reasons to be seriously concerned about the nature of the institutional transformation underway (Chamberlain 2015) .
Protecting patients first and foremost?
As the preceding section outlined, a growing body of practitioner-focused research evidence exists to suggest that the General Medical Council is indeed changing and taking a more robust stance toward complaints. However, while recognising that the evidence discussed so far is indicative that changes introduced by the Health and Social Care Act 2008 are indeed transforming the General Medical Council, it is equally important to highlight that significant countervailing evidence exists to suggest that the impact of this transformation on the public experience of the 14 complaint system appears to have been negligible. The latest General Medical Council figures show that in 2014 it received 9,624 complaints, yet 7,180 (75%)
were not subject to formal investigation, and of the 2,444 investigated, only 228 (10%) were later subject to a tribunal hearing, resulting in only 71 doctors (3%) having their names removed from the medical register (GMC 2015e). This seems a rather small proportion, even when it is acknowledged that not all complaints These figures suggest that the role of the General Medical Council in investigating complaints and (when necessary) acting to remove a doctor from the medical register, remains heavily problematic. Cause for concern remains over just how it decides which complaints it should investigate, as well as within this, the role played in its decision-making processes of finite financial and workforce resources. This is a particularly pertinent point given that the General Medical Council is selffunded via an annual subscription fee that all doctors on the medical register must pay. Indeed, the little independent research which exists into the General Medical For some observers, it is not clear why giving the General Medical Council the power to appeal against the decisions of the Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service should result in a major change in the current system and its outcomes. It is also not clear why the interested parties resist the creation of a fully independent and free standing entity to judge fitness to practice cases. Such an independent entity, with specialist input from health non-government organisations and patientinterest groups alongside professional medical and legal bodies, might well be better suited to the task (Clwyd and Hart 2013) . Indeed, as Gallagher and Mazor (2015) Furthermore, a key criticism of the current regulatory reform agenda is that when the patient experience and voice is included, it tends to centre on what the eminent medical sociologist and former independent General Medical Council member, Margret Stacey, referred to as an elitist 'the great and good' conception of public involvement in medical regulation (Stacey 2000) . Stacey noted that for most of the twentieth century the role of the public in regulatory processes, which is designed to act as a balance to professional and managerial interests, has been restricted to white male middle-class citizens from largely professional occupations, such as academia, law, the senior civil service and the police. The danger, Stacey argued, is that as a consequence, even when underpinned by good intentions, regulatory reforms run the risk of serving to further reinforce just how out of touch medical and socio-political elites can be with the increasingly diverse needs of the societies they profess to serve (Stacey 2000) of the panelists possessed a higher education qualification (compared to 34% of working age population); 98% came from middle to upper class occupational groups (compared to 25% of the working age population); and 99% came from managerial, senior public official or professional occupational backgrounds (compared to 25% of working age population) (ONS 2014). Their occupation backgrounds included the law (solicitor, barrister, magistrate, 26%); senior public service occupations (24%); health (19%); education (15%); business management (14%). Finally, the panelists also tended to be older than the general working population with an average age of 55 (compared to 40) (ONS 2014).
Thus, panelists are drawn from a relatively narrow section of the UK population (Savage et al 2013) . Such an unrepresentativeness of lay 'representation' is a familiar feature of public-sector regulation in Britain more generally (Gibbs 2015) . Elliott and Williams (2008) argue this biased representation is a barrier to ensuring regulatory regimes are truly representative of the societies whose interests they serve. This is certainly a worrying state of affairs given that small-scale research into how the GMC handles cases has revealed that individuals from working class conclusions, I would argue that that at this point in time, when the impact of reforms to the UK regulatory field are still unfolding, before any firm conclusions can be drawn, we need to first gather empirical evidence, which explores with both the public and practitioners, the impact of possible tribunal member bias on the patient and doctor experience of the reformed complaint process. To assist in this, in the next section of this article, I consider the broader risk implications of the current reform agenda for public perceptions concerning regulatory reform and patient safety.
The risk of optimism bias
In this context of minimalist reform and underrepresentation, I would argue that the current regulatory system is vulnerable to and undermined by, 'optimism bias' In the new system of medical and health care regulation, risk is no longer solely the focus of regulatory control, but rather also the means by which professional groupings have become subject to third-party probabilistic surveillance and control in order to help legitimise broader societal-level governing regimes (Power 2007 ).The introduction of medical revalidation, alongside reforms to the complaint and medical tribunal process, epitomise this trend within the medical and healthcare spheres. Every medical practitioner working in the UK is 'tagged and tracked', carrying with them every day to work their own personalised 'risk portfolio' (Chamberlain 2015) . These are especially constructed for medical regulatory and revalidation purposes and contain within their bindings all the information necessary for the reader to formulate a perception about the nature and extent of a doctor's clinical competence, as well as the depth of their professionalism, including perhaps most importantly, how adept they are at minimising injury to patients should a negative event occur (Chamberlain 2012 ).
However, these changes could be undermined by what Shepperd et al (2015) refer to as 'optimism bias'. This concept refers to situations where the high probability of positive outcomes is given more weight than the relatively low probability of harmful outcomes, even though such outcomes may have devastating consequences. Indeed, instead of reassuring members of the public, ongoing regulatory reforms, such as the introduction of medical revalidation, arguably run the risk of unrealistically increasing the 'risk optimism' of members of public so that they develop the view that negative events are so unlikely to occur that it is unnecessary to worry about them and that current protection measure will ensure no harm occurs (Rudisill 2013) . Given the claims that recent reforms of medical regulation in the UK will enhance patient safety, it is certainly likely that if and when individuals experience harm, they will blame those involved in the system for failing to protect them and creating a false sense of security even when harm involved was essentially unpreventable, an 'accident'. After all, within today's risk-adverse socio-political climate, it is possible to argue that there is a human factor in every event so 'accidents' in the sense of random natural unpreventable events no longer exist. This means that any chance of clinical underperformance should be identified and addressed via the revalidation process overseen by the There is the possibility that, instead of making the public more confident in medical regulatory reform when negative events occur, recent regulatory developments might instead lead to patients and their families possessing an unrealistic 'optimism bias' expectation that their complaints will automatically 25 lead to disciplinary action being taken against a doctor through a medical tribunal.
Therefore, if reformers want the regulatory system to be more 'legitimate', that is enhance public support for and confidence in the health care system, then those responsible for the institutions which manage risk, for example the General Medical Council, need to create a more realistic public expectation of what is possible, and to demonstrate that swift and effective action is taken if and when the individual or groups of practitioners do not have the skills and competence to prevent harm to their patients. Such legitimacy would be enhanced if there were broader and more representative public participation in regulatory processes (Chamberlain 2015) . At the very least, as I discuss in the next section of this (Chamberlain 2012) . I have also argued, however, that there is evidence that the General Medical Council's gatekeeper role in investigating complaints remains highly contentious. For example, in spite of an increase in the number of complaints and two decades of reform to the General Medical Council, the proportion taken forward for investigation remained relatively static at between 75% and 80% per annum, nor has there been a statistically significant rise in the number of doctors struck off the medical register (Chamberlain 2015) . This is significant as it appears, therefore, that legislative reforms designed to increase the ability of the General Medical Council to take action against incompetent doctors, have not achieved their intended goals, and indeed, run the risk of endangering already vulnerable patients further (Archer 2014). As a result, current moves to strengthen further 27 the investigatory and adjudication process, by legislating to ensure that the Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service is a more autonomous entity within the General Medical Council, appear problematic. I have argued that the current reforms, no matter how well intentioned, do not address the central concern that rather than reflecting the nature of the society whose interests they are charged to protect, both the General Medical Council and the Medical Practitioner Tribunal Service currently appear to fail in their institutional processes to fully account for the diverse nature of the complainant profile and to reflect the broader demographic composition of contemporary British society.
I have noted that there limits to the analysis in this article. In particular, there is limited information on this topic given historical access problems. While the still unfolding nature of the regulatory reform agenda means that considerable further empirical data must be collected over time before any firm conclusions can be drawn. It does not necessarily follow that improving the diversity of patient involvement in healthcare quality assurance and regulatory processes will lead to an increased level of public satisfaction (Dent and Pahor 2015) . This is particularly true when dealing with tribunal processes which frequently deal with highly complex and emotionally charged cases (Chamberlain 2015) . Nonetheless, greater diversity of patient involvement in regulatory and tribunal processes is arguably a necessity given the need for accountable and representative forms of public sector governance within democratic societies (Gibbs 2015) . Furthermore, as discussed earlier in this paper, managerialism plays a key role within contemporary riskbased regulatory processes for expert and professional groups, where there is strong central control is strongly exerted (Dent 2015) . The danger here is that adopting such administrative approaches to NHS service delivery without adequate representative public involvement to counteract practices involving collusion between doctors and NHS management, could undermine or subvert the focus of the regulatory reform agenda on promoting service quality and safety, in a manner not too dissimilar to what has happened in repeated high profile medical malpractice cases reported in the media since the early 1980s (Saks 2015) .
Furthermore, confidence in these systems may be undermined by risk optimism biases, so that evidence of failure creates shock and anger. To avoid such reactions those involved need to develop more inclusive risk management approaches if medical regulatory systems are to communicate more realistic perceptions of medical risk to service users (Chapin and Coleman 2009 ). Ferlie et al (2012) discuss how the increasing role of risk-based managerialist forms of governance in the field of cancer service management in the UK bring with them the possibly that medical systems and quality assurance processes may increasingly pay lip service to the notion of greater user involvement, but in reality concern themselves primarily with matters of economic efficiency and cost containment.
Lloyd-Bostock and Hutter (2008) suggest that under contemporary neoliberal mentalities of rule, risk-based regulatory approaches to health service delivery possess the potential to conflate the aim of risk identification and management with more effective cost management, rather than the promotion of an operational culture which first and foremost acts to protect service-users from harm. In this article, I have contributed to this discussion by highlighting the ways in which the current regulatory reform agenda is operating with a restricted conception of the patient experience and participation in relation to complaint and tribunal processes when a doctor's fitness to practise is called into question. A similar conclusion was drawn by the recent Francis inquiry. It argued for the need 29 to include more non-medical members within complaint management processes, in an effort to ensure greater transparency and accountability within professional and administrative dominated NHS operational systems, as these have in the past acted to subvert employment processes designed to support whistleblowing when problems occur (Francis 2013) .
Conclusion
A key implication of my analysis is its potential relevance to international jurisdictions, in terms of the need to increase the diversity of user-involvement in regulatory processes. Significant variation exists in how health care systems and the performance of medical work are regulated in Europe, the US and Australasia.
Nonetheless, as in the UK, these countries are undergoing an intensive period of health care reform, and furthermore, they arguably share the same underpinning regulatory logic, at least in terms of rhetorically emphasising the value of the participation of non-medical groups and patients for ensuring the more effective management of health care costs and risks (for example, see de Vries et al 2009, Giarelli 2014, and Risso-Gill 2014) . Yet in the pan-European, US and Australasian contexts, McDonald (2012), Chadderton et al (2013) , Beaupert et al (2014) , Bismark et al 2015 and Saks (2015) , have all suggested that patient involvement in regulatory regimes tends to be limited to particular elite interest groups, rather than reflecting the broad social strata of these diverse societies. This point was echoed by Bouwman et al (2015) , who concluded after reviewing the Dutch regulatory system that enhanced practitioner accountability and improvement in the detection of problems in health care will only emerge when a long-term learning commitment is made, on behalf of government and professional groups, to 30 promote more expansive and inclusive public participation mechanisms. The developments I have outlined and examined in this article tend to support this conclusion. We must begin to collectively act to challenge misconceptions surrounding what the diverse backgrounds and needs of health service users really are. If only so the all too often restrictive and exclusory neoliberal regulatory logic that tends to dominate the design of contemporary forms of risk-governance can be transformed for the greater benefit of all.
